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HYBRID POWER SHARING:  
ON HOW TO STABILIZE  
THE POLITICAL SITUATION  
IN MULTI-SEGMENTAL SOCIETIES1
There are various ways of reducing conflicts and of stabilizing the political situ-
ation in states where society is made up of many different ethnic groups and re-
ligious communities, and where relations between these segments – or between 
them and the central government – are tense. A particularly important way is 
the establishment in those states of a political system based on power-sharing 
(PS), which allows members of various ethnic and religious segments to take 
part in the exercise of power. The literature on the subject usually discusses two 
models of PS: consociationalism and centripetalism. A third model is encoun-
tered in practice, however, that of hybrid power-sharing (HPS), which combines 
the institutions of the first two. The main objective of this article is to explain 
the nature and origins of HPS. As examples, I will use the political systems of 
Nigeria and Indonesia. In the first part of the article I explain briefly the nature 
of PS, and of its two main models; in the second I explain what HPS is; in the 
third I analyze the emergence of HPS, and give the causes of the inclusion of 
consociational institutions in political systems in which centripetal institutions 
are dominant, using the cases of Nigeria and Indonesia; I draw conclusions in 
the final part.
Key words: power sharing, hybrid power sharing, consociational, centripetal, 
Nigeria, Indonesia
1 I am grateful to Donald L. Horowitz for offering valuable comments on this paper.
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There are various ways of reducing conflicts and of stabilizing the political situation in states where society is made up of many different ethnic groups and religious 
communities, and where relations between these segments – or between them and the 
central government – are tense. A particularly important way is the establishment in 
those states of a political system based on power-sharing (PS), which allows members 
of various ethnic and religious segments to take part in the exercise of power and fosters 
understanding between them and contributes in this manner to the achievement and 
maintenance of peaceful relations. The literature on the subject usually discusses two 
models of PS-based political systems: consociationalism and centripetalism. A third 
model is encountered in practice, however, that of hybrid power-sharing (HPS), which 
combines the institutions of the first two.
The main objective of this article is to explain the nature and origins of HPS. As 
examples, I will use the political systems of Nigeria and Indonesia. In addition to the 
introduction, this article is formed of four main parts: In the first I explain briefly the 
nature of PS, and of its two main models: consociationalism and centripetalism; in the 
second I explain what HPS is; in the third I analyze the emergence of HPS, and give 
the causes of the inclusion of consociational institutions in political systems in which 
centripetal institutions are dominant, using the cases of Nigeria and Indonesia; I draw 
conclusions in the final part.
At the outset, it is worthwhile to note that Nigeria and Indonesia share many traits. 
The two countries occupy a vast area, 924,000 km2 and over 1.9 million km2 respec-
tively, which is home to large populations, 196 million,2 and 265 million,3 respectively, 
according to estimates from 2018. Nigeria is the most populous country on the African 
continent, and also the seventh most populous country in the world. Indonesia is the 
third most populous country in Asia and the fourth most populous in the world. Most 
significantly, however, both countries are highly diverse ethnically and religiously. Ni-
geria is home to about 250 ethnic groups,4 among which the largest are the Hausa-Fu-
lani (about 29% of the country’s population), the Yoruba (about 21%), the Igbo (about 
18%) and Ijaw (about 10%).5 It is estimated that over 50% of Nigerians are Muslim, 
about 40% are Christians of various denominations, and about 10% follow traditional 
beliefs.6 In turn, Indonesia is home to at least several hundred autochthonous ethnic 
2 Worldometers, Nigeria Population (Live), 2018, at <http://www.worldometers.info/world-
population/nigeria-population/>, 3 March 2018.
3 Worldometers, Indonesia Population (Live), at  <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/
indonesia-population/>, 3 March 2018.
4 “Nigeria”, Encyclopedia of the Nations, at <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/
Nigeria.html>, 3 March 2018. 
5 “Nigeria Demographics Profile 2018”, Index Mundi, at <http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/
demographics_profile.html>, 3 March 2018. 
6 Ibid. My discussions with Nigerian political scientists in Nigeria in 2018 indicate that in recent years 
the number of followers of Islam in Nigeria has been rising steadily.
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groups.7 In keeping with data from the 2010 general census, the Javanese are the largest 
ethnic group in Indonesia (a little over 40% of all inhabitants). Other significant groups 
include the Sundanese (about 15.5%), the Malay (about 3.7%), the Batak (about 3.6%), 
the Maduro and Betawi (about 3% each).8 The Chinese form Indonesia’s largest group 
of immigrant population (about 1.2%). The vast majority of Indonesians, as many as 
87%, are Muslim (overwhelmingly Sunni); Christians of various denominations make 
up a little fewer than 10%; and Hindus about 1.7%.9
In both Nigeria and Indonesia, the history of territorial unification, and that of 
the ethnic and religious groups forming their populations following independence (in 
1960 and 1949 respectively) has been turbulent. Both countries experienced conflicts 
in relations between ethnic and religious segments making up their population, as well 
as between such segments and the central government. In order to normalize those rela-
tions, both countries introduced PS-type institutions.
MODELS OF POWER-SHARING: CONSOCIATIONALISM  
AND CENTRIPETALISM
There are two basic understandings of the term power-sharing in the literature – in the 
wide and narrow sense. The term PS in the broad sense can be used in connection with 
the participation of various groups or institutional entities in some form of power. In 
the horizontal dimension it can encompass sharing power for example by various po-
litical parties; by political parties with institutionalized non-party entities like various 
social organizations and movements; between the sexes; between the parties to a con-
flict, such as rebellious organizations and the government; and also between the politi-
cal elite and citizens. In the vertical dimension the term PS can be used in connection 
with the sharing of power between the central government and regional governments 
or local government institutions.
PS in the narrow sense refers to the systemic sharing of power in multi-segmental 
societies (especially deeply divided ones) by segments (groups, communities), mem-
bership in which is based on cultural criteria (such as, for example, common lan-
guage, religion or celebrations) and ascribed ones (such as, for example, common an-
cestors, relatives, and racial background),10 especially such as nations (understood in 
the sociological, not political sense), ethnic groups and religious and denominational 
communities.
7 G. Macdonald, Election Rules and Identity Politics: Understanding the Success of Multiethnic Parties in 
Indonesia, Washington, DC 2013, p. 4.
8 “Indonesia Demographics Profile 2018”, Index Mundi, at <https://www.indexmundi.com/indonesia/
demographics_profile.html>, 3 March 2018. 
9 Ibid.
10 B. Krauz-Mozer, “Tożsamość – czy to tylko suma spotkań i opowieści?”, Studia Środkowoeuropejskie 
i Bałkanistyczne, vol. 26 (2017), p. 14. 
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In the narrow sense, PS should be seen above all as a type of political system.11 The 
notion of ‘political system’ includes the structures, organizations, consciousness, cul-
ture, relations, values and norms that are characteristic of the political community in 
which it appears.12 The basic elements of a political system, however, are its institutions 
as represented by a set of rules. A set of specific institutions, in turn, forms specific 
PS models. The narrow understanding of PS is mainly reflected in formal institutions. 
Most theoreticians seem implicitly concordant as to the basic institutions forming PS 
in a narrow sense. The attribution of given institutions to one of the PS models (types), 
especially the consociational or centripetal models, depends on which they correspond 
to in conceptual terms. The term PS in the narrow sense encompasses two main ele-
ments: sharing of power in multi-segmental societies by elites of the segments defined 
using cultural and ascriptive criteria; and the functioning of a specific set of institutions 
which further the maintenance of peaceful relations between these segments and be-
tween the segments and the central government.
Two main types of PS in the narrow sense: consociationalism and centripetalism 
(also called integrative PS) are usually distinguished in the literature. Their conceptual 
foundations are different. The philosophy of consociationalism rests largely on the rec-
ognition of group rights.13 It is worth repeating that in the context of PS in the narrow 
sense, groups, or segments, are mostly nations, ethnic groups, and religious and denom-
inational (confessional) communities which form part of multi-segmental societies and 
often inhabit a given territory in compact settlements. In the spirit of consociational-
ism, such segments should be entitled to certain particular rights if only by virtue of 
their possession and articulation of group interests.
According to Stuart J. Kaufman,14 the most important group interests, distinguished 
on a cultural and ascriptive basis, include linguistic, religious and economic interests. 
The first two types of interests are strongly tied with the desire to maintain a sepa-
rate identity. Economic interests (and de facto political ones at the same time) include 
11 T.D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts, Washington, DC 1996, 
p. 4; B. Reilly, Political Reform and the Demise of Consociationalism in Southeast Asia, Perth 2011, 
p. 8, at <http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/21774/1/Political_Reform_and_the_
Demise_of_Consociationalism_in_Southeast_Asia.pdf>, 14 March 2018.
12 However, when the political system of a multi-segmental country is not yet marked by a philosophy 
of thought and action in the spirit of peace and inter-segmental sharing of power, i.e., when PS-
type arrangements are being introduced mechanically as an attempt to put an end to conflict or in 
a post-conflict context (for example as a result of an ad hoc peace agreement ending conflict between 
two mutually hostile ethnic segments), PS can be considered as a strategy (and a set of political and 
legal arrangements serving it) aimed at conflict management or resolution. However, even in such 
a situation, PS-type arrangements can form a significant part of the political system, a consensual 
political culture should evolve, and the awareness of the necessity for a joint nurturing of compromises 
attained exists. 
13 Philosophy here is understood as general principles and ideas which form the basis of a given PS model 
in the narrow sense. 
14 S.J. Kaufman, “Ethnicity as a Generator of Conflict”, in K. Cordell, S. Wolff (eds.), Routledge Handbook 
of Ethnic Conflict, London 2011, pp. 91, 94-95.
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those related to the exercise of power over a given territory and the maintenance of land 
ownership by members of a given segment, which may be particularly important when 
natural resources exist in that territory.15 Such interests also include the hiring of seg-
ment members in public offices and agencies (parastatals) in keeping with the principle 
of proportionality through the use of quotas. The task of consociational institutions 
is to protect and reinforce group interests. The protection of those interests implies 
the maintenance of a status quo, i.e. most particularly the continued flow of benefits, 
economic ones, for example. Reinforcing group interests especially means perpetuating 
them or reaching out for even greater benefits.
The philosophy of consociationalism (in its dominant, classic version,16 called cor-
porate17) entails one’s interests are never better served than by oneself. One can thus rest 
the essence of consociationalism on the assumption that, in a multi-segmental society, 
especially one that is deeply divided, individual segments, as interest groups of sorts, 
should have their own representation in the state power structure and a role in political 
decision making. In consequence, group interests are best served by consociational, ide-
ally formally entrenched,18 institutions such as: segmental parties19 (especially ethnic 
and religious ones) forming grand coalitions; segmental autonomy; proportionality in 
elections, division of government posts, positions in public agencies or – sometimes – 
in the army; and a minority veto right. It is best if the decision making process in the 
consociational system rests on the consensual approach to issues by the segmental rep-
resentatives, even though this is often difficult and time consuming.
The philosophy of centripetalism has a more limited relationship with group rights. 
Centripetalism, like consociationalism, as a type of PS is intended to assure members of 
various segments of a share in power, but not as part of particular institutions protect-
ing and reinforcing the interests of individual segments, but in the dimension of supra-
segmental, or inter-segmental institutions, i.e., institutions that are open to individuals 
15 About economic interests as a fundamental component of the economic dimension of group rights 
see, for example, R. Lemarchand, “Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, African Affairs, vol. 106, no. 422 (2007), at <https://doi.
org/10.1093/afraf/adl041>, p. 3; K. Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the 
African Experience, Oxford 1997, p. 90
16 J. McGarry, “Conclusion: What Explains the Performance of Power-Sharing Settlements?”, in 
A. McCulloch, J. McGarry (eds.), Power-Sharing: Empirical and Normative Challenges, London 2017, 
p. 281.
17 In theliterature, the so-called liberal consociationalism is also distinguished, which assumes, among 
others things, the existence side-by-side of institutions nurturing groups rights and supra-group 
institutions referring to individuals or to society as a whole, and not to ethnic or religious segments. 
See, for example, A. McCulloch, “Consociational Settlements in Deeply Divided Societies: The 
Liberal-Corporate Distinction”, Democratization, vol. 21, no. 3 (2014), at < https://doi.org/10.1080/
13510347.2012.748039>, pp. 501-518; R. Taylor (ed.), Consociational Theory: McGarry and O’Leary 
and the Northern Ireland Conflict, London 2009, passim. 
18 At times, however, informal consociational institutions (such as, for example, Nigeria’s rotating 
presidency) can turn out to be more significant than formal guarantees (such as, for example, Bill of 
Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for the Papua).
19 Called at times communal parties.
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from all segments. Such an approach is intended, above all, to create among the mem-
bers of the political elite integrative political behavior cross-cutting segmental divisions 
which, reaching beyond group interests, depoliticize the segmental separateness and, in 
this manner, reduce their significance.20 Political activity within the framework of the 
centripetal PS model is supposed to be focused on state affairs rather than on inter-seg-
mental relations or those between segments and the central government.
Centripetalism, in contrast to consociationalism, does not promote institution-
al recognition of segmental differences and interests. Quite the contrary, the essence 
of centripetalism is to foster cooperation not so much between segments as between 
members of different segments, and even sui generis forcing them to cooperate by cre-
ating an integrative institutional framework. The principal formal centripetal institu-
tions include supra-regional and inter-segmental parties and, should the need arise, co-
alitions between them; decentralization leading to a division of large segments into 
smaller parts that inhabit different, ideally multi-segmental states or provinces, thus 
inclining regional political elites of different segments to collaborate with one another; 
the election of a supra-segmental (supported by members of various segments) presi-
dent through the use of the so-called territorial vote distribution requirement, i.e. the 
need to win an appropriately large number of votes in presidential elections in the ma-
jority of states or provinces (meeting this requirement is indispensable to occupy the 
presidential office, and merely winning a numerical majority of votes is insufficient),21 
and (at least in theory22) the use in elections to the parliament (especially its lower 
house) of so-called preferential voting, either in the form of a proportional single trans-
ferable vote system (in multi-mandate districts), or a majority alternative vote system 
(in single-mandate districts).23
20 B. Reilly, Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific, Oxford 2007, especially 
pp. 83-91; B. Reilly, “Centripetalism”, in K. Cordell, S. Wolff (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Ethnic 
Conflict…, especially pp. 291-295; B. Reilly, “Centripetalism: Cooperation, Accommodation and 
Integration”, in S. Wolff, C. Yakinthou (eds.), Conflict Management in Divided Societies: Theories and 
Practice, New York 2011, pp. 57-65.
21 K. Trzciński, “Centripetal Spatial Vote Distribution Requirement in Presidential Elections: Cases of 
Nigeria and Indonesia”, Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia, vol. 30, no. 1 (2017), K. Trzciński (ed.), Special 
Issue on Power-Sharing in Asia and Oceania, pp. 89-107, at <http://aav.iksiopan.pl/images/AAV/
AAV_30_1/Krzysztof-Trzciski.pdf>, 16 March 2018.
22 Opinions about the optimal parliamentary election system for centripetalism in the literature of the 
subjects are hugely different.
23 Preferential voting, thanks to a ranking of candidates conducted by the voters, makes it possible for 
them to indicate preferences among candidates from different parties. In the case of centripetalism, 
the aim of such voting would be to reduce chances of the election to parliament of politicians showing 
little restraint in their political views and actions, particularly with regard to inter-segmental relations. 
Preferential voting systems functioned for a time in Sri Lanka, Fiji and in Papua New Guinea, among 
other places. See B. Reilly, Democracy and Diversity…, pp. 115-118; A. McCulloch, “Does Moderation 
Pay? Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Societies”, Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of 
Ethnopolitics, vol. 12, no. 2 (2013), at <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2012.658002>, pp. 111-
132; A. McCulloch, “The Track Record of Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Places”, in J. McEvoy 
and B. O’Leary (eds.), Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places, Philadelphia 2013, pp. 94-111.
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THE NATURE OF HYBRID POWER SHARING
Both consociationalism and centripetalism have their drawbacks. And so, above all, 
consociationalism can increase the awareness of segment members about the benefits 
that ensue from belonging to a given segment in conditions in which consociational 
institutions exist and, in consequence, strengthen segmental identity and politicize 
ethnicity. Centripetalism, on the other hand, can protect mainly the interests of the 
principal segment,24 or segments,25 in the state. Therefore, centripetalism can serve 
large segments, which coopt in a limited manner to the participation in power of 
those members of the political elite of smaller segments which are willing to coop-
erate. Neither of the two models, in their “pure” form, needs to meet its objective, 
i.e., limiting inter-segmental conflicts (or between segments and the central govern-
ment) and, in consequence contribute to building political stability in multi-segmen-
tal conditions.26
In order to mitigate the above-mentioned drawbacks and some others, institutions 
proper to both main PS models are sometimes combined in one political system, al-
though this does not happen frequently. At first glance, consociationalism and centrip-
etalism are difficult to reconcile. This does not mean, however, that institutions proper 
to one or the other model cannot co-exist in one state. Just as, from the perspective 
of PS in the broad sense, right-wing and left-wing political parties can share power in 
a state by forming a governing coalition, so, from the perspective of PS in the narrow 
sense, consociational and centripetal institutions can function side by side in the same 
multi-segmental society. Together, they form a third PS model in the narrow sense, 
which I propose to call hybrid power sharing. In short, HPS is a real type of inter-seg-
mental PS system, which includes elements that can be referred to as heterogenic, as 
they originate with PS models that have different conceptual bases.
24 In Indonesia, for example, there is one main ethnic group – the Javanese, and one main religious 
community – Muslims, the majority of whom are Sunnis.
25 In Nigeria, for example, there are three main ethnic groups – the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, and 
two main religious communities – Muslims and Christians (mainly Protestants). 
26 As the notion of a state’s “political stability” is often understood in many ways, it is worthwhile to recall 
its usual essence. This notion includes political and economic elements. Taking into consideration 
the many proposals put forward by scholars or research centers attempting to define or analyze this 
notion, one can state that it includes, first and foremost, elements such as lasting (i.e., not subject to 
too frequent change) governments enjoying some form of legitimacy; a state where internal violence is 
absent (and in international surroundings, if it affects internal security); a low level of social tensions 
and the existence of public order; the rule of law, strong constitutional mechanisms and accountability 
of those in power; a competent and efficient administration that is sensitive to the needs of citizens, 
and other state institutions; the lack of structural changes accompanied by violence and a breakdown 
in the functioning of state institutions and of the rule of law; a low level of corruption; and a business 
climate favorable to the development of entrepreneurship and investment. See K. Trzciński, “Czym 
jest stabilność polityczna państwa?”, Przegląd Politologiczny, no. 2 (2015), pp. 44-45, at <http://
przeglad.amu.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/pp2015-2-037.pdf>, 18 March 2018.
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But as can be seen in practice, the elements of one of the PS models, centripetalism 
or consociationalism, are always dominant in a hybrid PS, not necessarily in terms of 
numbers, but rather of importance within the political system (including in terms of 
its impact and formal status). HPS can be found in Nigeria,27 and in Indonesia,28 for 
example. Centripetal elements are dominant in the political systems of both countries, 
but they are enhanced by consociational institutions.
The formal institutions of centripetal PS in those states are: a centripetal territo-
rial structure made up of multi-segmental states or provinces; the election of a supra-
segmental president through the use of a territorial vote distribution requirement; and 
supra-regional and inter-ethnic political parties.
In Nigeria, centripetal institutions are complemented with consociational ones, and 
are understood either as a type of grand coalition in Lijphart’s understanding of the 
term (or of so-called “universal participation”, or that of a ‘cartel of elites’),29 or an ema-
nation of the principle of proportionality especially in the political representation and 
in the appointment of employees of public institutions,30 or type of economic  PS.31 
27 K. Trzciński, “How Theoretically Opposite Models of Interethnic Power-Sharing Can Complement 
Each Other and Contribute to Political Stabilization: The Case of Nigeria”, Politeja, vol. 42, no. 3 
(2016), pp. 53-73, at <http://akademicka.pl/ebooks/free/c3b7109ec2dbc4b3834ccd59bc1d59d3.
pdf>, 19 March 2018.
28 K. Trzciński, “Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia”, Polish Political Science Yearbook, vol. 46, no.  1 
(2017), pp. 168–185, at <http://www.czasopisma.marszalek.com.pl/images/pliki/ppsy/46-1/
ppsy2017111.pdf>, 19 March 2018.
29 See A. Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and 
Practice, London 2008, p. 29; R. Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, Garden City, 
NY 1967, p. 276. Lijphart thinks that consociationalism does not always need to be a formally 
institutionalized system, but can be present solely in certain systemic arrangements and, at the 
same time, be in part reflected in the political custom or practice in place. And so, for example, 
a government made up of political parties representing members of various ethnic, linguistic, or 
religious groups is the purest form of the grand coalition based on the consociational model of PS. 
There can be other consociational arrangements at the level of the legislative and executive branches, 
such as, for example a coalition defined not in terms of a division of power between political parties 
formed on the basis of, for example, specific ethnic groups or religious communities, but rather 
on the maintenance of a measure of participatory proportion between representatives of most 
ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups of a plural society. Therefore, for Lijphart, the cases of, say, 
Lebanon or Cyprus (in the past), bear out the thesis that as far as the most important consociational 
institution – the so-called grand coalition – is concerned, one can use the wider term of “universal 
participation”, or that of a “cartel of elites” to use the notion coined by Ralf Dahrendorf. This 
position is close to centripetalism.
30 Although one can’t speak, in the second case, of the existence of some set proportions connected with 
ethnic groups or religious communities.
31 About economic PS see, for example, K. Miti, E. Abatan, S. Minou, “Is Power-Sharing a Solution to 
Africa’s Conflicts?”, Southern African Peace and Security Studies, vol. 2, no. 1 (2013), p. 2; A. Mehler, 
“Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship”, African Affairs, vol. 108, 
no. 432 (2009), p. 459; K. Trzciński, “Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia”…, p. 179; K. Trzciński, 
“The Consociational Addition to Indonesia’s Centripetalism as a Tactic of the Central Authorities: 
The Case of Papua”, Hemispheres, vol. 31, no. 4 (2016), p. 16, at <http://www.iksiopan.pl/images/
czasopisma/hemispheres/HEMISPHERES_31-4_2016.pdf>, 19 March 2018.
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These are, above all: the formal requirement of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious com-
position of the cabinet (so-called federal character principle of parity type);32 the infor-
mal principle of rotating presidency between Muslims and Christians or, to be correct, 
between the North, dominated by Muslims, and the South, inhabited mostly by Chris-
tians (the realization of this principle ensures a rotating representation in the office 
of the president among followers of both religions); the informal principle in keeping 
with which the vice-presidency falls to a member of a different religious community 
and ethnic group than that from which the president originates (the realization of this 
principle ensures the simultaneous representation in the highest executive body of fol-
lowers of both religions and members of different ethnic groups); and an economic PS 
institution consisting in the return by the federal government of part of the revenues 
derived from the exploitation of energy resources to a number of states in the south of 
Nigeria (the Niger Delta).33
In Indonesia, in addition to the main centripetal institutions, the following conso-
ciational institutions are in place: special autonomy for the provinces of Aceh, Papua 
and West Papua34 (one of the most important elements of such autonomy is the applica-
tion in Aceh of Sharia Law, which is not in force in other parts of Indonesia); economic 
PS arrangements, in keeping with which the provinces of Aceh, Papua and West Papua 
retain the lion’s share of the revenues generated by the exploitation of those provinces’ 
natural resources; and segmental parties: religious on the territory of the entire coun-
try, and ethnic in the province of Aceh. These institutions are emanations of one of the 
four main consociational institutions – autonomy for segments, which arises from the 
recognition of group rights.
The Nigerian and Indonesian HPS systems have mainly consociational institu-
tions which, at the same time, correspond to both ethnic and religious divisions, or 
such whose point of reference are ethnic divisions alone. There are fewer institutions 
which are connected only with religious divisions. The best examples of the latter 
type are the principle of the rotating presidency between Muslims and Christians in 
the case of Nigeria, and the possibility for religious parties to function in the case of 
Indonesia.
32 According to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 29 May 1999, at <http://www.wipo.
int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=179202>, 16 March 2018, the composition of the federal government 
and of all federal government agencies should reflect Nigeria’s “federal character” and there can’t be 
in them any preponderance of persons originating, as it was formulated, from a “few” states, ethnic 
groups or segments of another type (“sectional groups”) (art. 14 (3)). The above-mentioned state 
bodies also need to perform their obligations in a manner that doesn’t favor any specific Nigerian 
states, ethnic groups or segments of another type (art. 14 (3)). 
33 R.T. Suberu, “Federalism and the Management of Ethnic Conflict: The Nigerian Experience”, in 
D. Turton (ed.), Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective, Oxford 
2006, pp. 75-76; S.A. Rustad, Power-Sharing and Conflict in Nigeria: Power-Sharing Agreements, 
Negotiations and Peace Processes, Oslo 2008, pp. 19-22.
34 In the case of the provinces of Papua and West Papua, legally guaranteed special autonomy has been 
introduced only in part.
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WHY DOES HPS ARISE AND FUNCTION?
It is worthwhile to consider the origins of HPS. B. Reilly notes that, especially at the 
beginning of the period of independence, institutions that were either consociation-
al or corresponding to consociationalism were the preferred ones in many South-East 
Asian states.35 With time, some countries in this region turned toward centripetal in-
stitutions, a trend that was especially visible in the evolution of electoral laws and the 
elimination of segmental parties. Such was the case in Indonesia, for example. The same 
process took place in sub-Saharan Africa, in Nigeria.
Initially, after gaining independence, both Nigeria and Indonesia introduced cer-
tain consociational institutions to their political systems. And so, numerous segmen-
tal parties were active in both states – ethnic parties in Nigeria, and ethnic and reli-
gious parties in Indonesia. The Indonesian authorities considered the introduction of 
a federal system, while Nigeria had initially been a federation of three administrative 
regions, in each of which one large ethnic group held the dominant position. The ini-
tial period of the existence of both multi-segmental countries was unusually turbulent 
and the consociational institutions, whose number or influence was limited,36 were un-
able to prevent inter-segmental conflicts or conflicts between segments and the central 
government.
Moreover, the persistence of such conflicts could endanger the unity of the newly 
emerged states, in which there were centrifugal tendencies, including pro-independ-
ence ones that corresponded to segmental divisions. In its restricted version, consocia-
tionalism did not guarantee political stability in either Nigeria or Indonesia. In this sit-
uation, the two countries’ authorities turned to centripetal institutions, but these also 
turned out to be insufficient. In consequence, with time consociational institutions be-
gan to be added to the dominant centripetalism.
The general answer to the question about the reason for the emergence and con-
tinued existence of HPS in Nigeria and Indonesia, i.e., the combination of various ele-
ments from different PS models in one multi-segmental country is rather simple: It’s 
a combination of need and interest. The elites of a given segment can feel either a strong 
desire for guaranteed rights to something (to have segmental parties, for example) or 
the lack of such guarantees. Obtaining the right to something is seen as favorable for 
the segment in question. For example, it is assumed that segmental parties will better 
meet the needs of the segment than inter-segmental parties.
In each case, however, the need for HPS can be different, be articulated by the elites 
of one or more segments and refer to different PS dimensions. The implementation of 
HPS follows negotiations and is the result of an arrangement, which is satisfactory to 
different sides to some degree. The introduction into the political system dominated 
by centripetal institutions of certain consociational elements enhances centripetalism 
35 B. Reilly, Democracy and Diversity…, p. 186; B. Reilly, Political Reform…, pp. 4, 18-19.
36 Presumably to some degree on account of lack of acceptance from at least part of the political elites.
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in those areas in which it proves insufficient to produce a stabilizing effect. The ben-
efits from the use of, for example, consociational institutions in conditions where cen-
tripetal institutions are dominant can also be derived by the central government, be-
cause providing to a given segment the PS institutions it needs and demands can put an 
end to a long-lasting and costly conflict, as was the case in the Indonesian province of 
Aceh,37 for example.
The combination of centripetal and consociational elements should thus produce 
a stabilizing effect where centripetalism or consociationalism alone is insufficient. The 
combination of institutions of both main PS models may take place at different peri-
ods of development of PS in a given country. Late supplementations or adjustments to 
the system are not easy to carry out, however. The purpose of the PS is to stabilize the 
political situation, and any changes may bring instability. If, during the functioning of 
a given political system, certain segments begin to make serious demands for its recon-
struction, other segments may see this as signs of withdrawal from the original arrange-
ments, or even of a desire to fundamentally modify the existing system. This may desta-
bilize the political situation in the country. On the other hand, the lack of flexibility in 
changing the arrangements about the essence of PS can also be dangerous in situations 
when some important premises forming the basis for the introduction of this system 
have changed. In each of the aforementioned situations a conflict may either resume 
or increase in intensity, as was the case in Lebanon, for example. The case of Lebanon 
shows that sometimes the existing PS model requires corrections, which are difficult to 
attain otherwise than through the renewal of the conflict. Conflict, especially war and 
revolution, may also bring about a fundamental change in the political system, includ-
ing a change in the dominant PS model.
A good example of this process is Nigeria, where, in the first years of independence, 
there were institutions of a consociational type, including ethnic parties and a territo-
rial structure consisting of just a few administrative regions controlled by the main eth-
nic groups. In the mid-1960s, Nigeria began to turn to centripetalism, which was one of 
the causes for the outbreak of the so-called Biafra War, which lasted from 1967 to 1970. 
After it ended, a political system emerged in which centripetal institutions, including 
supra-regional and inter-ethnic political parties and administrative regions (states) of 
a multi-ethnic character, were dominant. As the Nigerian example shows, a shift from 
consociational institutions to centripetal ones may occur especially when the former 
prove inadequate, e.g. when they hinder the effective governance of a multi-segmental 
society or amplify some centrifugal forces. Such a shift may be particularly important 
in the context of attempts to implement a policy of national unification or, in other 
words, the unification of a multi-segmental society.
On the other hand, as is shown by the example of Indonesia – especially by the in-
troduction of special autonomy in Aceh – even the relatively late addition of institu-
tions of one model to the other (in this case, consociational institutions to centripetal 
37 See: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free 
Aceh Movement, signed in Helsinki on the 15 of August 2005, at <http://www.acehpeaceprocess.net/
pdf/mou_final.pdf>, 20 March 2018.
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ones) may prevent territorial disintegration of a multi-segmental country, and thus help 
to achieve a similar unification effect. It is thus difficult to speak of a rule regarding the 
time when elements of a different PS model are added to the dominant PS model.
As in the current political systems of Nigeria and Indonesia centripetal institutions 
are more important than consociational ones, it is worthwhile to consider the specific 
goals for the introduction of at least some consociational institutions in both countries.
Nigeria’s Consociational Institutions
The centripetal institutions established in Nigeria in the 1970s – especially the supra-
regional, inter-ethnic and inter-religious political parties – did not ensure a balance of 
power between the three largest ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo) and the 
two main religious communities (Muslims, Christians) in government and in appoint-
ments to public positions. Nor did they guarantee a measure of participation in power 
for smaller ethnic groups.
In consequence, the requirement for public bodies in Nigeria to comply with the 
federal character principle was introduced to the Constitution of 1979.38 This rule al-
lows members and representatives of different ethnic groups and religious communities 
to participate in these bodies. In keeping with the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria,39 the 
federal character principle is to promote national unity, support national loyalty and to 
give each Nigerian citizen a sense of belonging to the nation, irrespective of ethnic or 
religious affiliation. Its wider aim is to strengthen the integration of a multi-segmental 
society, to achieve political stability and to facilitate civilizational development.40
The effect of a multi-segmental composition of the council of ministers and other 
public bodies in keeping with the federal character principle can be sought in concord-
ance with either the consociational or centripetal philosophy. The federal character prin-
ciple takes on a consociational essence when it introduces parity in the form of quotas in 
some bodies, as is the case in the Nigerian government. The Nigerian constitution man-
dates that the cabinet be made up of at least one minister from each of the 36 states.41 This 
minister needs to be indigenous to that state.42 R.T. Suberu notes that Nigeria’s division 
into 36 states, in force since 1996, has led to a situation in which the three main ethnic 
38 See, for example, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1 October 1979 (enacted on 
21  September 1978), art. 14 (3), at <http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/nig_const_79.pdf>, 
16 March 2018.
39 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 29 May 1999…, art. 318. (1).
40 In the economic sense, the federal character principle can also refer to the participation of ethnic groups 
and religious communities in the distribution of state resources between the country’s administrative 
regions (states).
41 To compare, it is worthwhile to note that, in keeping with the provisions of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1 October 1979…, art. 135 (3) and art. 14 (3), also at least one minister in 
the government was to originate from each Nigerian state, but the Basic Law set the number of these 
at 19 (art. 3 (1) and First Schedule). 
42 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 29 May 1999…, art. 147 (3).
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groups are a majority in 21 states, while 15 states are governed by smaller ethnic groups.43 
By combining the constitutional requirement with the realities of the territorial structure, 
a formal parity of regional representation in government has been established and, at the 
same time – and indirectly arising from it – a parity of participation in the government 
of the main ethnic groups44 and religious communities,45 de facto in the form of seats re-
served for their members. Simultaneously members of smaller ethnic groups were allowed 
to take part in the exercise of power. In the case of states in which none of Nigeria’s three 
main ethnic groups is dominant, there is a greater probability of rotation of positions 
in government between the representatives of the smaller indigenous ethnic groups, for 
example in successive cabinets, than in the case when in a given state the majority of the 
population are members of one of Nigeria’s main ethnic groups.46
The federal character principle, in turn, seems to take on a more centripetal nature 
when it generally promotes in some public bodies their multi-segmental character, as 
is the case in the army,47 for example, without having a parity character. However, the 
problem lies in how, the federal character principle in the version reminiscent of cen-
tripetalism is carried out in practice, without formally guaranteed quotas, as in the case 
of the army of Burundi,48 for example.
The Federal Character Commission (FCC), in keeping with the Constitution of 
1999, is the guarantor of a just division of positions in Nigerian public bodies.49 Specifi-
cally, the FCC’s task is to promote, monitor and enforce compliance with the princi-
ples of proportional sharing of all posts in Nigeria’s public bodies.50 Recommendations 
issued by the FCC, however, show a preference for representatives of the larger ethnic 
groups in appointments to positions, and very frequently are of a quota character.51 Ul-
timately, the practice of dividing positions is more consociational in nature. Represent-
atives of the smaller ethnic groups are the most disadvantaged by this system.52
43 R.T. Suberu, “Federalism and the Management of Ethnic Conflict: The Nigerian Experience”…, 
pp. 73-74.
44 My discussions with Nigerian political scientists in Nigeria in 2018 indicate that the situation in 
which a member of an ethnic group having a dominant status in a given state becomes minister – or 
the “representative” of that state in government – is typical. 
45 Usually, the majority of members of specific ethnic groups is Christian or Muslim. And so, almost all 
Hausa-Fulani are Muslims, while the majority of the Yoruba and Igbo are Christians. 
46 These conclusions derive from my discussions with Nigerian political scientists.
47 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 29 May 1999…, art. 217 (3).
48 See S. Vandeginste, “Power-Sharing in Burundi: An Enduring Miracle?”, in A. McCulloch, J. McGarry 
(Eds.), Power-Sharing…, p. 169. Cf. M. Cammett, E. Malesky, Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies: 
Implications for Peace and Governance, “Journal of Conflict Resolution” 2012, vol. 56, no. 6, p. 990.
49 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 29 May 1999…, Third Schedule, Part 1 C, art. 8. 
50 Ibid., Third Schedule, Part 1 C, art. 8 (1) (b).
51 Abdul Raufu Mustapha, “Institutionalising Ethnic Representation: How Effective is the Federal 
Character Commission in Nigeria?”, CRISE Working Paper, no. 43 (2007), p. 11. Such conclusions 
also derive from my discussions with Nigerian political scientists.
52 The federal character principle gives rise to criticism also on account of the fact that non-professionals 
are employed in various positions because they have the “appropriate” ethnic and/or religious 
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Generally speaking, the federal character principle – more consociational than cen-
tripetal in nature – satisfies the interests of the main ethnic groups to a greater extent 
and those of minority groups to a lesser extent. It nonetheless creates a certain balance 
between large segments and, in this manner, constitutes some form of revision of cen-
tripetal institutions. The federal character principle is certainly not perfect in practice 
and has, therefore, many critics but it is difficult to imagine what relations between Ni-
geria’s largest ethnic groups and religious communities would look like if this principle 
was totally absent.
The formal federal character principle is supplemented by informal institutions. In 
Nigeria, the rotation of the presidency between Muslims and Christians, similarly to 
that of the presidency and vice-presidency for different religious communities and eth-
nic groups, increases the balance of power between Muslims and Christians and, at the 
same time, between the main ethnic groups. In consequence, it helps prevent any of the 
large segments from acquiring a dominant position, and this also indirectly benefits the 
smaller segments.
Nigeria also has an economic consociational institution consisting in the federal 
government returning to several southern Nigerian states located in the Niger Delta, 
part of the revenue earned from the extraction of oil and natural gas in those states. 
It has been introduced because Nigerian centripetalism has not eliminated the sense 
of economic injustice among members of segments inhabiting states,53 which generate 
greater revenue for the Nigerian central budget that do other states, thanks to the ex-
traction of energy resources. Presently the return by the federal government of part of 
the income from these resources to the Niger Delta states, namely 13%,54 mitigates the 
demands of the elites of the segments inhabiting those states, even if it doesn’t satisfy 
them entirely.
Indonesia’s Consociational Institutions
In the Nigerian HPS system, all segmental parties, including religious ones, are banned. 
This is not the case in Indonesia, where two types of segmental parties that are typical 
of consociationalism can exist: religious parties (i.e. those whose political programs ex-
plicitly refer to religious values) and, in the province of Aceh, ethnic parties (i.e. those 
which are supported mainly by members of a particular ethnic group, and whose politi-
cal programs refers to their needs and interests), often referred to as regional or local 
parties.
Agreement for the existence of religious parties in Indonesia is a tribute by the 
central government to the religious majority in Indonesia, i.e. Muslims, and to the 
affiliation. The allocation of positions in public institutions on the basis of knowledge and experience 
is called for, for example, by K. Asayu, “Federalism and Federal Character Principle in Nigeria: 
A Dilution”, Review of Public Administration and Management, vol. 3, no. 7 (2015), pp. 32-44. 
53 Such as, for example, the Ijaw and Ogoni ethnic groups.
54 R.T. Suberu, “Federalism and the Management of Ethnic Conflict: The Nigerian Experience”…, 
pp. 75-76.
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country’s largest ethnic group – the Javanese, the vast majority of whom are Muslims. 
It is therefore not a reaction to the centrifugal minority forces. Muslim parties in Indo-
nesia represent the majority religious segment, so they do not seem to be a threat to the 
lasting nature of centripetal institutions. The most popular among those parties55 are 
able to cross the mandatory 3.5% threshold for election to the lower house of parlia-
ment, the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR).56 These 
parties can also function effectively in Indonesia because they have a supra-regional and 
inter-ethnic character, one that is consistent with the centripetal legislation on political 
parties. The supra-regional character requirement and the mandatory electoral thresh-
old successfully prevent the emergence of Christian parties.57 These can only count on 
significant support from Christians, which belong to small ethnic groups living in such 
Indonesian areas like Papua, the island of Flores, the Maluku archipelago, parts of Cel-
ebes and Sumatra.58
In consequence, Christian-Democratic parties or those who simply refer to Chris-
tian values are practically of no importance on Indonesia’s political stage59. Conditions 
in which religious parties operate are beneficial for Muslim parties, and disadvanta-
geous for non-Muslim ones, thus create a situation in which consociational religious 
parties serve the followers of only the Muslim segment, and this might cause dissat-
isfaction especially in the Christian and Hindu segments,60 and could theoretically 
pose a threat to future relations between the religious majority and the central govern-
ment which it dominates, and the religious minorities. If, in the prevailing centripetal 
conditions, a consociational institution strengthens the majority politically, minority 
religious segments could demand that the activities of their segmental parties at the 
national level made easier, for example by abolishing the requirement for supra-region-
al parties,61 thus undermining the essence of one of Indonesia’s principal centripetal 
institutions.
The possibility for religious parties to operate in Indonesia is a continuation of a tra-
dition going back to the early days of independence. It should probably be considered 
above all from the perspective of the central government’s response to the demands of 
the conservative clergy and religious activists. The existence of Muslim parties may, by 
55 See K. Trzciński, “Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia”…, p. 180. 
56 Following the 2014 elections to the DPR, representatives of Muslim parties occupy about 31% of the 
chamber (173 deputies out of a total of 560 seats, in 2016). See Tentang DPR, Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat, at <http://www.dpr.go.id/tentang/fraksiz>, 21 March 2018. Members of three Muslim 
parties are members of the present cabinet of President Joko Widodo.
57 See K. Trzciński, “Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia”…, pp. 180-181.
58 It is worth recalling that, according to data from the 2010 census, Christians are less than 10% of 
Indonesia’s population, and Hindus about 1.7%. 
59 See D.L. Horowitz, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia, New York 2013, p. 187.
60 Hindus, who live largely in the province of Bali, do not have any religious party at present. 
61 My discussions with Indonesian political scientists in Indonesia in 2015-16 indicate that such a threat 
can increase with the intensification of Muslim migration to areas traditionally inhabited mainly by 
Christians. 
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channeling their political activity through a constitutional framework, limit the radi-
calization of Islam.62 Indonesia has had tragic experiences with the activities of the radi-
cal Muslim organization Darul Islam, which attempted to make Indonesia into a reli-
gious state (Negara Islam Indonesia) between 1949 and 1962.
On the other hand, the Indonesian government’s acquiescence to the introduction 
of political and economic consociational institutions in the Province of Aceh, or the 
only partially fulfilled promise to introduce them in Indonesian Papua (now the prov-
inces of Papua and Western Papua),63 were aimed at stabilizing the situation in provinc-
es where there were (or still are) active pro-independence movements seen by the cen-
tral government as separatist. Such concessions included special autonomy (allowing, 
among other things, for Sharia Law in Aceh), ethnic parties (practically only in Aceh), 
or leaving in those provinces the lion’s share of the financial revenues generated by the 
exploitation of natural resources there – up to 70% of the revenues Indonesia obtains 
from Aceh’s natural gas and oil;64 and 70-80% of the revenue from the exploitation of 
natural resources (70% in the case of oil and natural gas) in Papua.65
It is worthwhile to note, however, that in those spheres of power in which the Indo-
nesian government hasn’t been forced to make far-reaching political concessions with 
respect to specific segments,66 the leading role was retained by centripetalism or con-
sociationalism applied toward the majority (Muslim parties), or by consociationalism 
that was only tactical in nature, as in the case of Indonesian Papua, where promises to 
introduce consociational institutions were carried out in part only.67
A separate case is that of the province of Aceh, where the de facto vertical consocia-
tionalism forms an example of a win-win situation. It brings advantages to the minority 
(it gives ethnic political elites originating from the Free Aceh Movement a share in the 
regional government,68 and in decision-making concerning the distribution of funds) 
and, at the same time, to the central government (its introduction has led to the end 
of the armed conflict and to the unification of the state, albeit it reduced the revenues 
flowing to the central budget and originating from the exploitation of that province’s 
natural resources).
Tactical Consociationalism (the partially fulfilled promise to introduce consocia-
tional institutions) for Indonesian Papua brings greater advantages to one side, namely 
the central government (such as greatly curbing the conflict in Papua and the unifica-
tion of the state) and, at the same time, to the main ethnic and religious segment (the 
62 Such conclusions also arise from my discussions with Indonesian political scientists. 
63 K. Trzciński, “The Consociational Addition to Indonesia’s Centripetalism…”, pp. 5-20.
64 Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 11/2006 regarding Governing of Aceh, art. 181 (1b. 5-6) i (3), 
art. 182, at <http://pih.kemlu.go.id/files/UU%2011-%202006.pdf>, 22 March 2014.
65 Bill of Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for the Papua Province, art. 34 
(3) (b), at <http://papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-en.html>, 22 March 2014.
66 As was the case in the Province of Aceh.
67 K. Trzciński, “The Consociational Addition to Indonesia’s Centripetalism…”, pp. 5-20.
68 K. Trzciński, “Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia”…, p. 181.
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Javanese and Muslims to whom settling in Papua has brought economic benefits), even 
if in due course it could also bring economic and educational benefits to the autochtho-
nous population – the Papuans.69
Although Indonesian authorities are seeking, in keeping with the centripetal phi-
losophy, to blur the ethnic and religious differences that exist within Indonesia’s mul-
ti-segmental society and to turn them into an issue of marginal political significance, 
the formulation and introduction of the HPS system indicates that inter-segmental 
relations and relations between segments and the central government constitute a very 
important issue of Indonesian politics and economics because, among other reasons, 
conflicts in relations between the above mentioned entities occurred and/or continue 
to occur in areas where there are considerable natural resources.
As the above examples indicate, the implementation and functioning of specific 
consociational institutions in a PS-type political system in which the centripetal insti-
tutions have an advantage is highly justified in each case.
CONCLUSIONS
Although the main consociational and centripetal institutions have been identified in 
the literature, in practice full consociationalism can be encountered only rarely, while 
centripetalism in the pure sense currently doesn’t exist at all.70 Full theoretical models, 
i.e., those that include all the institutions attributed to them, are usually abstract, or 
ideal propositions, even if they are in large measure empirically based. In the real-life 
conditions of multi-segmental societies, all the institutions that characterize any of the 
theoretical PS models aren’t usually present, or only certain of their variants were intro-
duced, and these often depart from pure theoretical premises.
Hybrid power-sharing, on the other hand, is a vibrant model that is firmly embed-
ded in practice. It combines the institutions of centripetalism and consociationalism 
without predetermined arrangements about what number and which institutions of 
either model it must comprise. Naturally, institutions of one PS model are always domi-
nant in an HPS system. And so, in Nigeria and Indonesia centripetal institutions are 
prevalent, whereas in some other cases these may be consociational institutions. Sig-
nificantly, HPS is effective in that it produces peace and political stability, as opposed 
to concordance with some pure theoretical requirements, which are few in the case of 
HPS.
Leaving aside sudden political system changes (caused, for example, by a coup d’état, 
war or revolution), it may be assumed that every PS model, including HPS, functions as 
long as it is needed, and especially as long as it addresses the needs of the important seg-
ments that make it up. Important segments are those whose elites articulate segmental 
69 K. Trzciński, “The Consociational Addition to Indonesia’s Centripetalism…”, p. 20.
70 Although one may say that pure centripetalism did exist in Nigeria and Indonesia before those states 
re-introduced certain consociational institutions. 
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interests actively and want to take part in the exercise of power. It cannot be ruled out, 
and further research in this respect would be worthwhile, that adding institutions from 
another model to the dominant PS model is a temporary concession on the part of the 
dominant model’s proponents. But HPS may just as well be permanent in nature and 
appear where the institutions of centripetalism or consociationalism alone are not suf-
ficient for some reason. Thus, the consociational add-ons in the Nigerian or Indonesian 
PS system can be seen as a permanent concession on the part of the supporters of cen-
tripetalism to certain segments. Perhaps, thanks to such concessions, it was possible to 
attain in both countries the aims that are served by PS, i.e., to reduce conflicts in rela-
tions between segments, as well as between segments and the central government, and 
consequently to stabilize the political situation. It can’t be ruled out, either, that it is the 
introduction of consociational add-ons in the Nigerian and Indonesian PS systems that 
enabled PS and its dominant centripetal institutions to become firmly entrenched in 
the two countries
As I have attempted to demonstrate, HPS was born out of concrete needs and inter-
ests and from the need to reconcile them. This system exists because it brings benefits 
to various political actors in Nigeria and Indonesia: the segmental elites and the central 
government. But does it truly stabilize the political situation in both countries? Such 
stabilization in multi-segmental countries can be achieved to a large degree by reducing 
inter-segmental conflicts and conflicts between segments and the central government 
(although the latter can also be dominated by a specific segment, for example the Java-
nese in Indonesia). The problem is, however, that even though the intensity of conflicts 
between segments and between segments and the central government in Nigeria and 
Indonesia have been reduced since HPS was introduced in both countries, this fact 
can’t be directly attributed solely to the introduction of such a political system in both 
countries. The reduction of conflicts may be just as well due to many other factors, 
such as economic development leading to prosperity for an increasing portion of soci-
ety; school education programs that promote peaceful relations between members of 
particular segments and pro-state attitudes; the development of local self-government; 
and the greater effectiveness of state institutions, including those responsible for main-
taining peace.
For the time being, there are few tools for examining the effectiveness of political 
systems of the PS type. In the opinion of S. Wolff, formulated from the perspective 
of rational choice, if such stimuli (incentives, motivations) as power, status, security 
and economic gain are desirable and cannot be obtained otherwise than through the 
PS, the institutions in place should be accepted by the political elites of the multi-seg-
mental country, and their maintenance desirable, and this increases the probability that 
they will remain stable.71 P. Van Houten and S. Wolff believes72 that the effectiveness of 
PS can be researched by using empirical indicators, such as the absence of conflict (both 
71 S. Wolff, “Situating Complex Power Sharing in the Conflict Settlement Literature”, 2010, p. 2, at 
<http://stefanwolff.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/CPSbgrd.pdf>, 24 March 2018.
72 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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with and without the use of violence), which refer back to adopted PS institutions, the 
absence of infringements on specific aspects of such institutions, as well as the absence 
of political parties with a high following that contest these institutions. Data from rel-
evant public opinion polls may also be useful.
In my view, in the first question it is possible, with the use of the proposed indica-
tors, to compare the level of political stability following the introduction and consoli-
dation of PS (thus adopting a time frame) with the status quo ante; it is also possible to 
compare the level of political stability in a country where PS institutions already exist, 
with an analogous stability level of multi-segmental countries where such institutions 
were not introduced.
I am, however, skeptical about data from public opinion polls. The masses, to use 
Lijphart’s term, are usually unaware of the existence of PS institutions, or of the pos-
sible consequences of their absence. PS institutions represent a compromise and often 
do not fully satisfy anyone (Bosnia and Herzegovina may be the best example in this 
respect). Therefore, it does not make much sense to ask the public at large about its 
opinion about the effects brought by PS. It would be worthwhile, however, to study the 
views of members of the political elites of the political segments and representatives of 
the central government in this matter.
In the second decade of the 21st century there are no serious conflicts in Indonesia 
related to the introduction of PS institutions. Papua’s national independence move-
ment seems to have been effectively pacified, partly thanks to promises to introduce 
consociational institutions, something which the central government has not fully 
done. In Nigeria, the conflict in the Niger Delta has been extinguished. Just as the 
Papuans in Indonesia, the Nigerian Ijaw and Ogoni, and other ethnic groups living 
in the Delta, are not fully satisfied with their political and economic status. Commu-
nal conflicts erupt from time to time in Nigeria, especially in those local communities 
where Christians and Muslims live together. This fact may support the thesis that HPS 
remains of little effectiveness in some spheres.
The HPS systems in Nigeria and Indonesia are certainly not perfect political sys-
tems, because the smaller segments are not treated as they would like (a good example 
is the distribution of public positions in Nigeria), or are marginalized (as is the case, for 
example, with the only partial fulfillment of the promise to introduce consociational 
institutions in Papua). Therefore, even in this system the needs and interests of minori-
ties are not fully respected. In general, however, there are no serious conflicts in Indo-
nesia and Nigeria having to do with the adopted HPS institutions, infringements on 
specific aspects of these institutions, and there are no popular political parties contest-
ing HPS. One can state, therefore, that for the time being, HPS at least contributes to 
political stability in both multi-segmental countries. Some deviations from this situa-
tion should not be seen as confirming the political system’s low effectiveness, especially 
given their small scale and the fact that the societies of Indonesia and Nigeria belong to 
the largest in the world. Skeptics, on the other hand, should give rein to their imagina-
tion and consider what the level of stability and territorial integrity in both countries 
would have been, had they not adopted political systems such as PS.
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To end, it is worthwhile to point out why studying HPS is important. Firstly, the 
identification of HPS shows that combining institutions of different PS models truly 
takes place, despite the fact that these models are based on distinct conceptual premis-
es. Secondly, the existence of cases of HPS allows us to be convinced that centripetalism 
or consociationalism alone are often not sufficient to meet the needs and interests of 
some segmental elites, and that in order to reduce conflicts and achieve political stabil-
ity in a multi-segmental country it is at times necessary, at least during a certain period, 
to combine one PS model with some institutions of another PS model. Thirdly, knowl-
edge about HPS is useful in developing PS theory as such. Analyzing HPS has made it 
plain that pure centripetalism doesn’t exist. In the case of the two most advanced exam-
ples of centripetalism – Nigeria and Indonesia – each is accompanied by consociational 
elements, even though it is an asymmetric situation, given that centripetal institutions 
are dominant in both political systems. Identification of HPS is thus important, al-
though the essence of HPS itself requires further research and conceptualization.
Indeed, it is worthwhile to consider: What elements should entitle a given PS sys-
tem to be called a hybrid one? In other words, what criteria would a system need to 
meet for it to be recognized as a system that is hybrid in character? Theoretically speak-
ing, if each PS model had add-ons, even single ones, that are typical of a different PS 
model, only HPS would exist. Perhaps, therefore, the important criterion of hybridity 
of a PS system should be the number of elements from a model other than the domi-
nant one that it comprises. For example, if a given PS model had only one element from 
a model other than the dominant one, it might not make sense to refer to it as a hybrid 
system. However, a greater number of elements from another PS model would entail 
hybridity.
Perhaps a better criterion would be the level of the power structure at which an in-
stitution from a PS model other than the dominant one is found. For example, if insti-
tutions from both models were to be found at the nationwide level, then we could talk 
of an HPS system. If institutions from a PS model other than the dominant one were 
to be found at the regional level (e.g. some province of the state with a predominantly 
centripetal system would have special autonomy and segmental parties could function 
in it), then using the term HPS would not be justified.
But it would perhaps be worthwhile to apply both criteria – the number of elements 
of the model other than the dominant one and the level of power at which they occur – 
simultaneously. For example, a political system in which the dominant PS model has 
been supplemented by more than one element of another PS model, with at least one 
institution of the latter having to exist at the nationwide level, could be regarded as an 
HPS system. This is the case for both Nigeria and Indonesia.
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